SCtW: San Francisco Case Study


>> Back to entry page A project of the Annenberg Institute for School Reform	CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS NO. 2 Beacon Centers in San Francisco Ellen Foley Annenberg Institute for School Reform Amy J. A. Arbreton, Karen E. Walker Public/Private Ventures OCTOBER 2003 > Introduction > Guaranteed Funds for Youth Development > Beginnings of a Partnership for Youth Development > How the San Francisco Beacon Initiative Works > Implementation Challenges > Outcomes > Lessons Learned > Long-term Challenges > Update: October 2003 PDF file [18 pages, 513 KB] INTRODUCTION The "partnership" we studied in San Francisco has no formal name. It's not housed in a building and it has no director or other central authority, although some formal bodies do exist, including a steering committee. It was described by one of its leaders as "a self-organizing community with a shared-values framework for children and youth services and with considerable local autonomy for outcomes and strategies." ¹ The stage was set for this broadly based youth-services partnership in 1991, when a community-driven amendment to the city charter guaranteed funding for children's needs in the city budget. Around the same time, a "youth development" approach started to catch on among some of the city organizations that worked with youth. Four of these organizations formed a steering committee to plan the San Francisco Beacon Initiative – a series of community centers within schools. The committee also worked closely with an intermediary organization, Community Network for Youth Development, to help outline their theory of change and plan their actions. As of fall 2001, the partnership's Steering Committee consisted of staff from the San Francisco Unified School District, the Evelyn and Walter Haas, Jr. Fund (which represents a collaboration of private funders), the San Francisco Department of Children, Youth and Their Families, and the San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department. These efforts resulted in a flexible structure for the San Francisco partnership, which changes to meet the needs of the partners. The organizing structure emerged in response to the more than forty formal collaborative planning bodies already established in the city, which focus on specific programmatic initiatives. Separately, these collaborative structures had not been addressing the holistic needs of children and youth. San Francisco's partnership effort is three-tiered. It includes systems change at the leadership and policy level, implementation change at the site level, and a bridge between policy and practice through an intermediary level. Developing Beacon Centers in public schools was the partnership's first opportunity to build, test, and refine its structure. Work on the Beacon Centers has led to a broader partnership that is extending to more consistent collaboration across sectors and the infusion of a youth-development framework across city departments, agencies, and community-based organizations. __________________ ¹ Much of the material for this report was gathered at a meeting of the Design Group on Developing Family and Community Supports (July 2001, San Francisco) – part of the School Communities that Work initiative of the Annenberg Institute for School Reform. This and the other quotes in the report that are not otherwise attributed are from participants in this meeting. Please note that some aspects of the collaborative have changed since the information was gathered. For instance, Community Network for Youth Development is no longer the intermediary and the executive structure has been modified. (See Update: October 2003 at the end of this report for information about more recent events.) Back to text GUARANTEED FUNDS FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT A key factor set the stage for the San Francisco youth-development partnership: a successful grassroots effort to guarantee by law that a minimum level of funds for children's services would always be included in the city budget. The Children's Amendment In the early 1990s, Coleman Advocates for Children and Youth was a key player in the creation and coordination of youth-development activities in the city. After years of fighting for funding, Coleman staff decided that funding for children's needs had to be hardwired into the city budget. Initially, their goal was to have the city Board of Supervisors pass a law that would earmark some fixed portion of every tax dollar for children's needs. Margaret Brodkin, the executive director of Coleman Advocates, described their efforts: "We went to every elected official in the city and each one of them told us it was a terrible idea, or that it was bad public policy" because it would tie their hands in terms of spending. When they couldn't get the mayor or the city Board of Supervisors to endorse the idea, the Coleman staff and their allies among children's service providers went to work on it themselves. They collected enough signatures (over 65,000) to put the issue on the ballot for a referendum vote. The referendum, also known as Proposition J or "The Children's Amendment," proposed a two-part amendment to the city charter that would provide a baseline or "floor" for funding of children's services that could not be cut without violating city law; dedicate $0.025 of every $100 of assessed property taxes to children's services. Coleman turned to other political action groups, such as the Green Party and labor unions, to help them run the campaign. While there was strong opposition to the Amendment – particularly from the business community, which saw it as an unchecked effort to increase public spending – public support grew and city politicians' feelings changed. "By the end of the day, every [politician] wanted their name on the literature as a supporter," Brodkin recalled. When Coleman could show public support, "fewer people wanted to oppose us." In November of 1991, the referendum passed with 54 percent of the vote. San Francisco became the first city in the country to guarantee funding for children's services in the city budget. The referendum included a sunset provision, so in 2000 the Children's Amendment was again on the ballot. It had no opponents. Brodkin described the second campaign as "entirely different than the first campaign. There was an infrastructure that was already there. We had young people as the spokespersons for the campaign." The referendum passed by 73 percent of the vote; this time it was put in place for fifteen years, and the funding increased to $0.03 out of every $100. The Children's Fund After the 1991 referendum, newly elected mayor Frank Jordan designated the Mayor's Office of Children, Youth and Their Families (MOCYF) – created under the previous mayor, Art Agnos – to administer the funds (the Children's Fund) that had become available for supporting children and youth. MOCYF has now been made into a city department – the Department of Children, Youth and Their Families (DCYF). DCYF distributes monies from the Children's Fund to community-based organizations through a request-for-proposals process and also negotiates and monitors contracts for services provided by community agencies and city departments. In 2001, the department's budget was over $38 million (information from DCYF Web site, www.dcyf.org). The creation of the Children's Fund and the Mayor's Office of Children, Youth and Their Families "transformed children's services" in San Francisco. Many new programs were established, including the Girls After-School Academy, expansion of Wu Yee Children's Services, the Mayor's Youth Education and Employment Program, and the Beacon Centers. While the Children's Fund does not provide 100 percent of the financing the city needs to support services for children, it has given public officials, policy-makers, and nonprofit organizations an incentive to collaborate and many opportunities to make positive changes in their services for children, youth, and families. BEGINNINGS OF A PARTNERSHIP FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT The idea for youth-development centers in schools had been germinating in the Bay Area for several years prior to the establishment of the first of San Francisco's Beacon Centers in 1996. Initially, several Bay Area foundations – including the Evelyn and Walter Haas, Jr. Fund and the S. H. Cowell Foundation – led the way, influenced greatly by a 1994 visit to the New York City Beacons. Each of the New York City Beacons was operated as a community center, usually utilizing space in schools during nonschool hours to provide opportunities for recreation, tutoring, and adult education, among other activities, to children, youth, and their families. The foundation officers were impressed by the richness of the Beacons and hoped to catalyze their development in San Francisco. Meanwhile, many educators and youth-service providers were reading and learning about a new approach to youth services, now commonly referred to as "youth development." Rather than offering services only to children and youth who presented some kind of problem or deficit (teenage pregnancy, delinquency, etc.), the new approach emphasized providing services, supports, and opportunities to all children and youth to help them develop their assets and thus prevent future problems. Forming the Steering Committee The youth-development approach was understood and endorsed, to varying degrees, by leaders of four key organizations – the DCYF, the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD), Coleman Advocates, and the Haas, Jr. Fund. In late 1994, representatives from DCYF, SFUSD, and the Haas, Jr. Fund formed the Steering Committee, 2 whose first task was to put the youth-development approach into practice through the San Francisco Beacon Initiative (SFBI). Planning the San Francisco Beacon Initiative Members of the Steering Committee approached their task deliberately, meeting biweekly for two years to create a viable plan for the SFBI. As one of the committee members described it to evaluators from Public/Private Ventures: We had a very strong interest in seeing that this happened in a way that would have long-term sustainability, and we wanted to ensure quality. We wanted to give the local sites a lot of leeway in what the components might be, but the whole notion of developing youth leadership, adults and kids working together, was key. Also, this would be a public/private enterprise. (Walker & Arbreton 2001, p. 19) In 1995, to manage the initiative and provide technical assistance to the Beacon Centers, the committee hired an intermediary organization, Community Network for Youth Development (CNYD). CNYD, along with a researcher from the Institute for Research and Reform in Education, led a yearlong process in which the partners outlined their goals for the initiative and defined their "theory of change." This process helped establish a common language among the partners and provided a template to which the group could return to assess its progress and measure its success. As part of the planning process, the Steering Committee helped engage public bureaucracies, community-based organizations, and community organizers in the partnership. For example, the committee catalyzed the passage of ordinances by the School Board, the Board of Supervisors, the mayor's office, and the State Assembly that created a public-policy mandate for after-school services and improved coordination among schools and the community. This mandate made it possible to obtain waivers from the U.S. Department of Education to use federal funds more flexibly to support coordinated school and community services. One Steering Committee member also felt these efforts were crucial to gaining the support of then state legislator and current San Francisco mayor Willie Brown. The planning process also led to the key decision to give the Beacons autonomy but at the same time to connect them strongly to a "lead agency" – a community-based organization in the neighborhood of the school. This approach reduced tension around governance and turf issues and helped maintain the broad youth-development focus such as arts and recreation and career development that the Steering Committee wanted supported. The Steering Committee also leveraged the support for the Children's Amendment to create "public will" to advocate for the Beacons Initiative, drawing on the work of the youth organizers trained by Coleman Advocates. During one mayoral campaign, for instance, every candidate was forced to take a public position on the implementation of the Beacons. As Deborah Alvarez-Rodriguez, a member of the Steering Committee, noted, "The candidates understood that there were real votes linked to these youth organizers and the candidates needed to do something substantial if elected to office." Constructing a Theory of Change Karen Walker and Amy Arbreton (2001, p. 13) describe how the Steering Committee addressed the challenges of achieving consensus among diverse stakeholders and establishing accountability through the development of a theory of change. Over the course of one year, during 1996 and 1997, stakeholders in the SFBI undertook an extensive theory of change process led by the intermediary, CNYD, and . . . the Institute for Research and Reform in Education (IRRE). A researcher from IRRE who was experienced in the theory of change process and an expert in adolescent development conducted interviews with stakeholders from the Beacon Centers and the funders. Regular meetings among key stakeholders – funders, intermediary staff, and Beacon Center directors – were held to identify key long-term outcomes that the Beacon Centers hoped to achieve . . . . Meetings were also held at the Centers with staff, community residents, representatives from partner organizations, and students involved in the Center to discuss the goals of the initiative. Ultimately, the stakeholders identified two primary goals: The Beacon Centers would be able to improve the lives of youth and their families. The Beacon Centers would become stable hubs of community activity. After identifying key long-term outcomes, the Steering Committee constructed a model, or theory, of how the outcomes (i.e., changes) would be achieved. Using a five-year time frame, the group identified the early (to be achieved within the first two years) and intermediate (to be achieved within two to five years) outcomes that it assumed would be necessary to achieve the long-term outcomes. The resulting document was reviewed by stakeholders and revised. Out of this process, a theory of change was developed that "integrated practitioners' knowledge about the attributes of good youth programs and what it takes to get a new project off the ground with researchers' knowledge about child and adolescent development" (Walker & Arbreton 2001, p. 14). __________________ ² Later in the initiative, a representative from the Juvenile Probation Department was added to the Steering Committee. Back to text HOW THE SAN FRANCISCO BEACON INITIATIVE WORKS The Steering Committee's extensive preparations guided the development of the San Francisco Beacon Initiative and contributed greatly to its stability and success. This preparation included building widespread public engagement with the reform and working out a coherent theoretical foundation. The theory of change developed by the SFBI stakeholders made explicit assumptions about how to improve the lives of youth and their neighborhoods. It also allowed stakeholders to establish specific common goals, which in turn allowed a coherent approach to evaluation, and defined three organizational levels at which change needed to occur. The funding was another important aspect of this initiative. Building on the city funds earmarked for children and youth, the Steering Committee planned in detail the financing of the initiative, using both public and private funds. Goal-Setting and Evaluation Walker and Arbreton (2001, p. 16) describe how the theory of change has kept the initiative focused on clear and agreed-upon goals. The SFBI stakeholders not only used the theory of change to set their course at the beginning of the initiative, they have used it throughout the initiative's development to reflect on their progress and plan further implementation strategies. The intermediary, in particular, has taken the lead in using the theory of change as a management tool and in ensuring that people who are new to the initiative understand what the SFBI hopes to accomplish and how it hopes to do so. The theory of change has also been a key in designing evaluation strategies. The overall evaluation was designed to examine the initiative's early, intermediate, and long-term outcomes. One of the ways that defining a theory of change has helped the SFBI has been to allow its participants to agree upon designated long-term outcomes and to agree to hold the initiative accountable for those outcomes. It has also been used repeatedly to explain the initiative to new staff members at all levels. There has thus been little of the "mission drift" that so frequently occurs in community initiatives. Although stakeholders from all levels of the initiative expressed ambivalence about the theory of change process because it was lengthy and time-consuming, most of them – from Steering Committee members to Beacon directors to ground staff – reported that it had been useful to spell out expectations and assumptions behind the initiative. At the site level, the Center directors both understand and rely on the underlying assumptions and hypotheses of the theory of change. When describing what they were aiming for, most directors talked about the importance of safe places, high-quality youth-development programs, high levels of youth and family involvement, well-trained staff, and community leadership. They also understood the general roles of the initiative-level effort, and their comments about the role of the intermediary reflected the theory of change; that is, the intermediary was to provide resources and supports to build site capacity as well as to build the staff's understanding of and commitment to youth development. As one Beacon staff member reported, "I feel like it's much more clear, when we think about the youth programs, what goals we're trying to address because there's a guiding youth-development framework." Three-Tiered Administration The organization and administration of the initiative also grew out of the Steering Committee's work on the theory of change. Walker & Arbreton (2001, p. 14–16, 24) describe the three-tiered organization. The SFBI is administered on three levels: the site level, the intermediary level, and the initiative level. Each level plays a specific role and has specific responsibilities for ensuring that certain or designated outcomes are achieved. Site Level The site level consists of the Beacon Centers, their lead agencies, their host schools, and their local communities and agencies. It is the initiatives' most visible level; the tasks for which it is responsible include creating the Beacon Centers themselves, staffing them, engaging the community, coordinating programs and ensuring that the programs are of high quality. The Beacon Centers' staff are responsible for coordinating efforts at the site level. Although each Beacon Center is located in a particular school and is expected to shape its programs and activities to reflect the needs of its school and community, the Beacon Centers all have shared goals. They strive to provide a visible, accessible, safe, and welcoming place for youth, adults and families associated with the host school and the neighboring community. They all endeavor to encourage community engagement and leadership by establishing councils that promote input and by partnering with other agency providers in the community. In addition, the Beacon Centers seek to maintain a range of activities, provided by a well-trained, diverse, and responsive staff, that promote short- and long-term positive outcomes for youth and adults. Intermediary Level The intermediary provides support for both the initiative and the site levels . . . . [M]uch of the intermediary's work focuses on developing positive partnerships among multiple stakeholders . . . . [The intermediary is also responsible for] the development of the public-support campaign and . . . resources . . . to the sites regarding youth-development best practices. Initiative Level The tasks of the . . . initiative level center on developing funding streams and working toward the long-term sustainability of the Beacon Centers. At this level, the Beacon Steering Committee is primarily accountable for ensuring that tasks get done. In addition, the Sustainability Committee – consisting of people from the Steering Committee, the intermediary, and the Beacon Centers – was formed in 1998 to identify funding possibilities and to discuss and work to resolve challenges to the initiative. Structure of the Beacon Centers The Centers, inspired by the New York City Beacons model, are designed to be neighborhood gathering places that provide a rich array of developmental opportunities for community youth in the nonschool hours as well as activities for adults. The Centers aim to fill a social gap in urban communities that lack places to come together for enriching activities. Although some Beacon Centers provide traditional social services, their goals are much broader. As community centers, they are designed to be responsive to the local needs and conditions of specific neighborhoods. The communities' ethnic makeup, organizational resources, and specific youth and adult needs shape the Centers' operations and offerings. Each Center, therefore, has a unique personality and feel. At the same time, the Centers are linked by a common mission that is guided by the SFBI theory of change. As centers of youth development, they are expected to provide a broad range of challenging and enriching opportunities in five core areas: education, career development, arts and recreation, leadership, and health. An early planning task was the selection of school sites to host the Beacon Centers, a crucial undertaking in a broad-based, long-term initiative. To create a sustainable initiative, early Centers needed to deliver services effectively and be visible to the San Francisco community. In addition, they had to be located in communities of need. Support at three levels – the school district, the school, and the community – was crucial. A Beacon Center could not be located in a school that did not show at least formal support. In practice, school support ranged from formal agreements on the part of school staff to very strong and proactive lobbying by school staff for a Center. Two criteria that were established early on but which the planning group was willing to overlook were the presence of an empowerment zone and the identification of a strong lead agency. Site selection for the Beacon Centers resulted in eight Beacon Centers in diverse communities across the city. Six of the host schools are middle schools, one is an elementary school, and one is a high school. Each Beacon Center is administered by a lead agency that is responsible for both fiscal management and coordination of Beacon Center programs and staff. Center staff and their lead agencies together are responsible for determining the actual content and schedule of the Beacon programs. The tasks for which Center staff are responsible include scheduling and overseeing activities at the Centers, identifying and contracting with individuals or agencies that provide services and activities, fund-raising for additional resources, and managing the budget. A strong feature of the Beacon Centers is that they organize a wide range of programs which are implemented by a diverse array of providers: Beacon staffs, individual contractors, and agencies. During fall 1999, for instance, according to the Public/Private Ventures report, the number of activities and services provided by the Centers ranged from fourteen to twenty-four activities in distinct content areas (some activities had two or more sections; they were not counted separately (Walker & Arbreton 2001, p. 4) Activities are scheduled during lunch, after school, in the evenings, and during the summer, and they range from daily and weekly programs to one-time events. Every site provides activities for youth of all ages as well as for adults. By design, much of the work carried out in the Beacon Centers depends on a range of partnerships with agencies and individuals who provide many of the activities. Building partnerships with provider agencies is presumed to bring several benefits to the Beacon Centers. First, it may enhance the range and number of activities the Centers can offer. Second, partner agencies may contribute in-kind resources to the Centers. Both benefits enhance the Centers' capacity to serve more youth with more services. In addition, in communities where collaborating agencies have not had a prior presence in the local neighborhood, the partnership not only enhances the Beacon Center, but also brings new resources into the community. Financing In the planning stages the Steering Committee delineated the financing of the initiative, agreeing from the beginning that both public and private funds would be necessary. Public funds would be devoted to the operating costs of the initiative; private funds would provide needed flexibility to the budget, supporting planning and other start-up costs. Securing public funding required hard work and persistence. Two Centers planned for opening in 1995 were delayed until the following school year when planned-for federal funding did not materialize. The Steering Committee continued to work on the problem of securing public funding; the city came through with the bulk of the financing. In 1996, with strong public support and as the new mayor, Willie Brown, touted "Beacon schools," the first two San Francisco Beacon Centers were opened. Two more Centers opened within the same year. Currently, eight Beacon Centers operate in the city. The city continues to provide the bulk of the funds for the Beacon Centers – about $2.5 million ($311,000 each for eight sites) annually. "The city's substantial monetary contribution was possible only because unrestricted public funds for children and youth services were available" (Walker & Arbreton 2001, p. 19). Private sources provide about $1.6 million annually to support the management and evaluation of, and technical assistance to, the initiative. The Haas, Jr. Fund, in particular, made a commitment to provide funding, and city leaders credit the Fund with "helping to leverage a huge chunk of core funding from the public sector." Beacon Centers have also raised their own money. They have written proposals for public and private grants and done grassroots fund-raising with parents and youth. Many Centers have leveraged in resources that exceed the initiative's core funding. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES While financial and public support for the Beacon Centers is strong, implementation remains a challenge that requires constant vigilance. Bridging Gaps of Expectations and Understanding between Educators and Youth-Service Providers One key issue in implementation is bridging the gaps between the schools and the youth-development providers in the goals they define for children and for the initiative. As one Beacon director and his host principal told us at the San Francisco meeting, "There is a difference in how we approach the problem and a difference in the definition of youth development between school and advocates. [Sometimes] there is a tension between whether the basic goal is academic achievement versus youth development." Other Beacon staff and host-school counterparts elaborated on this tension. Beacon directors felt that the focus on student achievement, driven by high-stakes accountability systems put in place by states and school districts, was pursued to the detriment of other important goals for students. "The emphasis on test scores pushes us toward a more narrow focus." The Beacon Centers' staffs are eager to build on the promise that Beacons offer for "enlarging the notions of opportunity to learn." But they are frustrated that communicating "how a youth-development environment connects with academics" is so difficult. "We can't talk about it simply." Additionally, school staff and Beacon staff have differing expectations of what the Beacon Center should do for the school. "We all [Beacons and host-school staff] say that we're about youth development. You can work off of that good will in the beginning. But pretty soon, people will expect to have what they perceive as the intended outcomes of the program met. Some individuals will have different expectations: one teacher will expect a child to have his homework done; another might have the expectation that the kid will be fed." At least some of these misconceptions are a matter of development and time. Beacon staffs and their host-school principals told us that building relationships among staff of the two organizations was a challenge. "Working together becomes easier when you have opportunities to know each other, but often Beacon staffs and school personnel are working on different schedules and don't get a chance to interact." Changing Notions of What a School Principal Is Beacon Center staffs were sympathetic to the demands placed on principals of Beacon host schools. One Beacon director told us, "What goes into being a school principal has changed, but we haven't changed the way they are being compensated. [Beacon school] principals are being asked to do a much bigger job than the traditional principal job. It requires many nights and weekends and they don't get extra pay to do it." Managing Tensions between Schools and Their Communities Beacon Center staff also described the difficulty of "being pulled in different directions." One Beacon director explained, "The school and the community are not always in sync and that can lead to conflict. Sometimes there are tensions with the Beacons' community development role when the school is underperforming. Advocacy for higher achievement can be perceived as 'attacking' the school." The question is "Are Beacons a resource for the school or a resource for the community?" In San Francisco, as in many other places where busing is prevalent, the school community is not the same as the neighborhood community and, occasionally, the Centers and the schools were at odds about who should receive the services or be targeted by the services of the Beacon Centers. There were certainly both opportunities and challenges in having a lead agency involved in the relatively autonomous Beacon sites. This unique feature was very helpful initially. Now, as the Beacons continue to develop, the structure may also need to evolve. Functioning in Changing Contexts SFBI was undertaken at a time when the school district was in flux; for example, in five years San Francisco had three superintendents and the school principals were also changing frequently. It is a challenge to accomplish much within the school system when there is so much change occurring, and it is even more difficult when the reform is partly taking place outside of school, as is the case with the SFBI. Still, some of the Beacons were working very positively and closely with their host school. OUTCOMES Public/Private Ventures' 2001 evaluation of the Beacon Initiative (Walker and Arbreton 2001) cites the following outcomes at three levels. Initiative-level Outcomes The systems-level partnership shows promise in enabling the initiative to meet its goals; has forged effective collaborations that have advanced the initiative's goals; has had mixed success in creating systems change. Intermediary-level Outcomes The intermediary (Community Network for Youth Development) ensured that institutions involved in the initiative communicated regularly; aligned the work of many youth-program providers to work toward the goals outlined in the Beacon Centers planning process. Site-level Outcomes The Beacon Centers have successfully recruited youth with poor academic records to the Beacon Centers programs; reached their target goals for serving youth and adults; provided an array of activities during school and nonschool hours; devised effective strategies to address training, communication, coordination, and activity implementation, all of which contribute to the quality of the Centers' programs; addressed ongoing challenges stemming from the unique local circumstances in each of the schools and communities. LESSONS LEARNED The experiences of the San Francisco Beacons are rich in lessons for future work. Some overall factors operated at all levels of the collaboration; other factors were unique to each of the three levels of organization. Overall Lessons Several global factors appear to account for the collaboration's successes. Strong, Personal Relationships Strong leadership exists both at the Centers and at the initiative level. Having strong leadership within the local lead agencies and at the Beacon Centers considerably eases the implementation of strong programs at the Centers. Not only can the local leadership provide strong oversight and coordination at the Centers; it can also draw on local networks of providers to bring activities into the Centers. Strong leadership at the initiative level has enabled the SFBI to raise funds to provide adequate resources to the Beacon Centers. With those resources, the Centers themselves have been able to leverage many other resources. Initiative-level leaders have also used their citywide networks to introduce potential partners to the initiative. Strong Links between All Levels of Organization The initiative and site levels are linked through two structures. The intermediary has served as a conduit for information between the Beacon Centers and the Steering Committee. In addition, the Sustainability Committee, formed in 1998 to discuss and implement strategies for the initiative's future, has provided a much-needed open forum for Beacon Centers and the Steering Committee to discuss important issues. The intermediary provides support to both the Steering and the Sustainability committees. Intermediary staff work with members of both committees to set and distribute agendas. They ensure follow-through on issues that emerge in meetings. One advantage of having the intermediary provide this support is that its knowledge of the overall initiative and its stakeholders ensures that communications go to the appropriate parties. Initiative-level Lessons The extensive preparatory work to create a unified conceptual vision as well as broad public support and engagement ensured that the initiative took hold. Importance of a Conceptual Framework Steering Committee members were in agreement that having youth development as the framework for all their efforts has been a key factor in SFBI's success. One Steering Committee member said, "Youth development does not mean just more activities and services. The idea is that youth need to be grounded in meaningful, active ways in the community. This idea is very powerful here. There was a theory behind the work." Another told us, "Having youth development as the cornerstone of what we wanted to do raised the bar for all the programs." She noted that the youth-development language is now infused in the language of the school district, in children's services, etc. Getting theoretical alignment around youth development also had other benefits, including reducing the tensions that inevitably arise around collaboration. "We have alignment around youth development, so we don't have to argue about intention." Public Engagement to Ensure Sustainability Steering committee members also felt that the Beacons have flourished and have benefited from an expanded public support. The public support came through deliberate efforts among Steering Committee members and the intermediary organization to engage city supervisors and school board members in site visits to the Beacon Centers and the deliberate decision to locate each of the Beacon Centers in a different voting ward. Intermediary-level Lessons Two consistent strategies have supported San Francisco's efforts at multisector collaboration in the Beacon Centers initiative. Critical Role of the Intermediary First, the intermediary organization has played a critical role. In addition to the Community Network for Youth Development, other intermediaries that were involved include the Starting Points Initiative and the Early Childhood Interagency Council. Cross-Organization Accountability Second, the partners have consistently opted to cofund positions, so that there are at least a few people working in the partnership that are accountable to more than one organization. For example, one position – the Coordinator, City Sponsored Programs – works out of the central administration of the San Francisco Unified School District but is funded jointly by the school district and the Department of Children, Youth and Their Families. Site-level Lessons: The Role of Partnerships Working with multiple agencies and individuals has enhanced the initiative's capacity to provide a range of youth-development activities to many youth. Partnerships with the host schools are crucial to the development and maintenance of the Beacon Centers. Staff used several effective strategies for building relationships with school personnel. Some Centers enlisted support from the principal or assistant principal to encourage teacher buy-in; some used paid staff as liaisons who met regularly with both Beacon and school-day staff; some provided services and resources to the school staff; and some had regular meetings to discuss the needs of particular students. LONG-TERM CHALLENGES The Beacon Initiative not only faces constant implementation challenges, as discussed above, but also faces more global and longer-term challenges. Sustainability Before the Sustainability Committee was formed in 1998, intermediary staff, the Steering Committee, lead agency executives, and Beacon Center staffs were all working on future sustainability, but they did not have a common forum in which to meet. The Sustainability Committee was created to meet that need, a decision that seems to have provided multiple benefits to the initiative. Members of the Steering Committee take pride that the San Francisco Beacons Initiative has been able to sustain itself to this point. They mentioned that SFBI's dual neighborhood-specific and centralized approach has developed public support and attracted resources to the Centers. However, as the initiative evolves, the responsibility for sustainability will belong increasingly to the sites and less to the members of the Steering Committee. The sites' ability to build on the framework laid by the committee will help to determine the future success of the initiative. Long-term Funding Some members of the Steering Committee believe that the strength of the public and private organizations providing governance for SFBI and the collaboration between these organizations have provided stability to the initiative. The partner organizations have been able to leverage more resources together than exclusively public or private entities would have been able to secure alone. Because San Francisco is governed by a single city and county government, public funding and resources are very accessible to the Beacon Centers. San Francisco's abundant foundation community and the leadership provided by these foundations have also given strength to the collaboration. The combined resources provided through the collaborative effort of these organizations seem to have aided in the sustainability of the initiative. A few individuals question whether this public/private governance structure is really advantageous to the sustainability of the initiative. For example, although one Beacon director clearly valued these close ties with funding organizations, he indicated that it was difficult to seek funding from organizations outside the collaborative. In addition, an SFUSD representative also felt that a governance structure based solely on funding is not stable. While there is some disagreement about the degree of stability offered by the public/private partnership, the greater concern is the adequacy of funding these organizations provide. The Beacon Centers do not charge any fees for services and must rely completely on external funding. Both public and private funds have been affected by the economic downturn and events of September 11. Meanwhile, the declining youth population in San Francisco has increased competition for funds among youth-serving organizations, and the Haas, Jr. Fund is advocating for a lessened dependence on private funding by the Beacon Centers over time. Each of these factors has alerted initiative stakeholders to the need to devote increased attention to development issues. Steering Committee members have made concentrated efforts to maintain funding from private foundations. Private funding may be relatively unstable because the funding strategy for the Beacon Initiative requires foundations to deviate from traditional patterns of giving. In the Beacon Initiative, foundations are encouraged to make long-term contributions to core funding rather than time-limited donations designated for a particular program. To help foundations embrace this nontraditional philosophy of giving, members of the Steering Committee have held meetings during which the merits of funding a collaborative effort are presented to the foundations. The Community Network for Youth Development maintains that it is difficult for funders to work together, but their motivation to do so increases with enhanced understanding of the additive effects of their individual contributions. The Haas, Jr. Fund has taken a lead role in convincing other private foundations to continue their support through the next stage of the initiative. Perhaps as a result of their persuasion, two foundations have actually increased their level of support. Most stakeholders are also optimistic about the Beacon Centers' ability to weather the current economic and environmental challenges. The public support campaign launched to ensure the passage of the Children's Amendment has not only resulted in increased funding, but has also helped the Beacon Centers to gain a positive public image. The public support and public funding may make the Beacon Centers less susceptible to negative environmental factors than other nonprofit programs. Evolving Leadership The issues and challenges faced by the Beacon Initiative are daunting enough on their own. But addressing these challenges in an environment of constant change in political context, leadership, and roles and responsibilities adds even more complexity. High-level Personnel Changes Several individuals expressed concern about the changing leadership on the Steering Committee, because political alliances have been crucial to the sustainability of the initiative. Key leaders from the DCYF and the Haas, Jr. Fund have used their influence in the past to maintain funding and support for the Beacon Centers. As of January 2002, a new director of the DCYF and a new representative of the Haas, Jr. Fund were appointed to the Beacons Initiative Steering Committee. Additionally, a change in the city government structure will affect the way that stakeholders approach the issue of gaining public support. Because elections are now districtwide rather than citywide, it is necessary to gain the support of district representatives from every Beacon neighborhood, in addition to the support of key city leaders. Evolving Site- and Initiative-level Roles and Responsibilities As the initiative negotiates changing leadership within its governance structures, the role of each of the partnering organizations in sustaining the initiative has also evolved. The Beacon Centers, the lead agencies, the host schools, and the Sustainability Committee will each be involved in future sustainability efforts to some degree. Perhaps the greatest change in sustainability efforts is the increased reliance on site contributions. At the site level, Beacon staffs can directly solicit the support of neighboring nonprofit organizations. Members of the Steering Committee mentioned that meaningful partnerships with community-based organizations (CBOs) have been a key to sustainability. For example, CBOs have been willing to serve as lead agencies and to provide programs through the Beacon Centers. The sites are focusing on ways to increase these types of partnerships; some Centers have already solidified successful partnerships. The Experience Corps program and a case management services program, for example, have contributed stable funding and programming to the Centers. As existing partnerships are expanded and new partnerships are formed, the Beacon Centers hope to make significant contributions to sustainability. As the role of the sites increases, some of the demands placed on the Beacons around the issue of sustainability may be felt most keenly by those Centers that do not receive active support from their host schools. Representatives of the SFUSD and the School Health Program mentioned that the sustainability of the Centers is contingent on continued school support and Beacon/school integration. Additionally, Beacons are dependent on after-school program funding to varying degrees. Yet the majority of the Beacon directors mentioned a lack of support from the schools when asked about the role they play in sustainability. Perhaps because the SFUSD is not governed by the city government, there are challenges to coordinated sustainability efforts. For example, one Beacon director said, "It would help if they [the school] would stand up and say that the Beacon is a wonderful program, but I'm not sure that will happen. If they could, it would be nice." Another director indicated that the school has no real role in sustainability. A third has actually experienced resistance to the continued expansion of the Beacon Center and, as a result, has begun to explore relationships with other schools. The San Francisco Beacon Initiative has demonstrated what a committed, focused, and unified urban community can do to enhance its children's education and development. Stakeholders recognize the many potential challenges facing the Beacon Initiative. But they are also confident that the past accomplishments of the Beacon Centers, combined with strategic planning for the future, can overcome these obstacles. __________________ Reference Walker, Karen E., and Arbreton, Amy J. A. 2001. Working Together to Build Beacon Centers in San Francisco: Evaluation Findings from 1998–2000. Philadelphia: Public/Private Ventures. UPDATE: OCTOBER 2003 Since the data for this case was collected, the Steering Committee has restructured the SFBI. Because the initiative has moved from a development phase toward institutionalization, the Steering Committee decided to move from reliance on an intermediary to an executive director model. In February 2003, the first SFBI executive director began work out of the San Francisco Department of Children, Youth and Their Families. The executive director's work – evaluation, fundraising, and managing partnerships (including relationships with the district), among other responsibilities – collectively supports all eight Beacon sites. She serves on the Sustainability Committee and meets regularly with the Beacon directors, but does not have line authority over them. CNYD (formerly the SFBI intermediary) no longer provides services to the SFBI. Other elements of the SFBI remain the same: core funding is provided through the Children's Amendment, all Beacon services continue to be free, and youth development is the underlying organizing theory. The first major accomplishment of the executive director's office was to finalize the quality standards for the SFBI. The quality standards include early, intermediate, and long-term goals for the Centers, including, for example, standards for Center staffing and accessibility as well as standards for impact on participants' health, academic, and social outcomes. The standard-setting process was done in collaboration with a representative team of site directors, site and school staff, and district leaders and was supported by Resource Development Associates (RDA). RDA will regularly collect data and provide reports on the quality standards to each site, with reports timed so that the information can be used by Center leaders for planning and continuous improvement. Meanwhile, the state of California recently passed Proposition 49, which, beginning in 2004–2005, will permanently earmark funds for before- and after-school programs providing tutoring, homework assistance, and educational enrichment. Virginia Witt, the executive director, feels the SFBI is in a unique position to provide leadership and to model quality as new after-school initiatives develop through this new source of funding.
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